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The theoretical analysis of Japan’s liquidity trap is developed by Krugman (1998a,b,c; 1999)
in terms of both an “intertemporal maximization” framework and an “..absolutely
conventional open economy IS-LM model”. In this note I examine the latter version of the
story and argue that Krugman’s analysis is obscured by reliance on the Fisher parity
relationship. The distinction between the cost of capital and the return on capital is introduced
to make sense of Krugman’s analysis.
 The final version of Japan’s liquidity trap is presented in Krugman (1989,c; 1999) and the
essence of the IS-LM version runs as follows. The IS and LM curves are defined by
distinguishing between the nominal rate of interest i, and the real rate of interest r. Following
Fisher, the nominal rate is defined as the real rate plus expected inflation as in the traditional
approximation to the Fisher parity condition.  The IS and LM curves are written as;
) , ( ) , ( y r I y r S = (6)
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) , ( / i y L P M = (7).
From Krugman’s definition, a liquidity trap occurs when  0 = i  and  0 < r  which implies that
even when  0 = r the economy has a surplus of saving over investment at full employment;
). , 0 ( ) , 0 ( f f y I y S >  Krugman’s liquidity trap is illustrated in Figure 1.4
Figure 1
Krugman (1998c: 2, italics added) then argues:
 “…. that the full employment real interest rate is negative [ 0 < o r ]. And monetary policy
therefore cannot get the economy to full employment unless the central bank can convince
the public that the future inflation rate will be sufficiently high to permit that negative real
interest rate.
That’s all there is to it. You may wonder why savings are so high and investment demand so










currently constituted needs expected inflation is not the least exotic: it is a direct implication
of the most conventional macroeconomic framework imaginable”.
I think it is clear from the highlighted sections that Krugman is arguing that if the real rate of
interest, r, is negative the economy needs an inflation adjusted nominal interest rate that is
also negative. In terms of the Fisher parity relationship Krugman is suggesting that a negative
real rate ( o r < 0) can be offset by inflationary expectations of an equal magnitude. In other
words we can think of the Fisher parity relationship as  π + = = r i 0  because
0 0 > = < π r . But this line of reasoning is misleading - for several reasons.
(i)  The distinction between the cost and the return on capital is obscured.
(ii)  Krugman’s proposal to produce a negative cost of capital to equate to the negative
return on capital makes no economic sense.
(iii)  Inflationary expectations will induce a rise in the nominal rate of interest (the cost
of capital) unless the BOJ acts to hold down the nominal interest rate.
The key to clarifying Krugman’s argument is to stress the distinction between the cost of
capital and the return on capital. From that perspective, the nominal rate of interest is a
proxy for the cost of capital while the real rate on interest is a proxy for the return on
capital. Krugman’s liquidity trap is a situation in which the return on capital is negative
but the cost of capital cannot be depressed below zero. Hence the economy is trapped at
the equilibrium E1.
What is the solution to this problem?6
Krugman suggests that if the BOJ can induce inflationary expectations that would do the
trick because the Japanese economy needs a negative real rate of interest. But this
diagnosis and proposed solution involves confusion between the cost and the return on
capital. Wicksell’s distinction between the money and natural rates of interest is more
relevant because it reflects the distinction between the cost of capital and the return on
capital. The Japanese economy may well suffer from a negative real return on capital (in
terms of modern Wicksellian terminology, Tobin’s q <  0) but in that case the solution is
not to generate a negative real cost of capital.  What the Japanese economy needs is a
positive (non-negative) real return on capital. That is, the Japanese economy needs a
Tobin’s q > 1.
Would inflation and inflationary expectations produce the desired outcome? Maybe.
If the solution to Japan’s liquidity trap is to increase the return on capital, (raise the
marginal efficiency of capital, r) inflation could produce this result if it increases prices
faster than costs, ie., if the inflation is of the demand-pull variety. A demand-pull inflation
can, in principle, increase the marginal efficiency of capital (by increasing profits)
relative to the cost of capital and ultimately increase investment so it is logically possible
for Krugman’s proposal to work.  I am ignoring here the fact that in Japan’s case this
process may be attenuated by the extent to which mal-investment has resulted in
redundant capital. The process of adjustment will require that this capital be written off
and that may take some time. It also ignores the state of confidence of the Japanese public
whose liquidity preference will rise if the state of anxiety and uncertainty increases.7
Another difficulty arises with Krugman’s proposal because the inflation and inflationary
expectations engendered by the BOJ’s “irresponsible” monetary policy would, according
to the Fisher parity relation, cause nominal interest rates to rise.  Hence, even if inflation
succeeds in increasing the marginal efficiency of capital there will be no stimulus to the
economy if the interest rate rises pari passu.  (This is straight out of the General Theory).
What is required then is for the BOJ to hold the nominal interest rate at zero (or at least
below the rising marginal efficiency of capital) in the face of inflationary expectations.
Hence, in my opinion, and contra Krugman, what Krugman’s analysis suggests is that the
Japanese economy needs is a non-negative marginal efficiency of capital, not a negative
real cost of capital.  A demand-pull inflation fuelled by an “irresponsible” monetary
policy could, under ideal circumstances, do the trick if increased expenditure increases
the marginal efficiency of capital relative to the cost of capital.  Krugman’s analysis of
the Japanese predicament is obscure because of the failure to clearly distinguish the cost
of capital from the return on capital. It is a moot point whether Krugman’s “irresponsible”
monetary policy would work in the face of the mal-investment and political economy
dimensions to Japan’s malaise.
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